Rebecca McKell v. Spanish Fork City et al : Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1956
Rebecca McKell v. Spanish Fork City et al : Brief of
Plaintiff and Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Elias Hansen; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McKell v. Spanish Fork City, No. 8494 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2568
I 
Civil No. 8494 
511 
uw b•h 
It:. I~U, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTl\1;1 I 
fi. ·LED 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA McKELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SPANISH FORK CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, .ThiARCELL US NIEL- Civil No. 8494 
SON, J. W. ANDERSON, ED M. 
BECK, ARTHUR G R 0 T E G U T , 
BERT D. ISAAC, J. ROWE LEWIS, 
.and LINDSEY B. SNELL, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STArrEMENT OF CASE 
This action was commenced by A. T. McKell, now 
deceased, against Spanish Fork City, Its Mayor, City 
Councilmen, and Lindsey B. Snell, Its Water Superin-
tendent, Utah County, and Its County Commissioners, 
and some of its employees, and also some of the em-
ployees of the State Road Commission of the State of 
Utah. 
After the action was commenced and before the 
same came on for trial, Rebecca McKell, the wife of A. 
T. McKell, was substituted as plaintiff in lieu of her 
deceased husband, A. T. McKell. The basis for making 
the substitution was that Rebecca McKell was .a joint 
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tenant with her husband, A. T. McKell, prior to his 
death, and was such joint tenant at the time complained 
of in the Complaint. (R. 56-57). The action is for dam-
ages done to plaintiff's lands, the improvements and 
personal property thereon by reason of the defendants 
having constructed a dyke along a road, the title to which 
was in Utah County, Utah. Such road extends east for 
about one-third of a mile from the northeast corner of 
plaintiff's land. As a result of the construction of the 
dyke along the road, large quantities of water which 
had overflowed the banks of Spanish Fork River, were 
concentrated along the southern side of the dyke so 
constructed and forced over plaintiff's lands. The water 
so forced over plaintiff's land cut large gulleys through 
the same and carried away improvements, together with 
some farming equipment located thereon. It is so alleged 
in the complaint (R. 20) and the a1nendment thereto (R. 
50 and 54). 
Numerous motions were filed by the defendants 
whereby they sought the dismissal of the action on 
various grounds. \V e shall not undertake a discussion of 
such motion because before the cause can1e on for trial, 
such 1notions were all disposed of and the case was 
tried on the issues raised by plaintiff's A1nended Com-
plaint (R. 20) and the mnend1nent thereto, and th.J 
answers of the defendant Spanish Fork City and Its of-
ficers. Before the case came on for trial the action w.as 
dis1nissed as to all of the defendants except Spanish 
Fork City and its officers. The dismissal was had pur-
suant to a motion of plaintiff, A. T. 1\Icl(ell. (R. 63). It 
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will be seen from the motion that the same was made 
and granted pursuant to a stipulation and the payment 
of the sum of $2000.00 by Utah County and $2000.00 
with an appropriation made by the Legislature of the 
State of Utah. It will be noted that the motion and the 
order granting the smne were with prejudice as to the 
parties against whom the same was dismissed, but with-
out prejudice .as to those against whom it was not dis-
missed; that is, without prejudice as to Spanish Fork 
City, its Mayor, City Councilmen and Superintendent 
of its Water Works. (R. 63 to 65). In its original 
answer Spanish Fork City and its officers alleged that 
they did not participate in the construction of the dyke 
except to permit some of the trucks belonging to the 
City to haul some of the gravel (under the direction of 
Utah County) onto the road extending east from the 
northeast corner of plaintiff's land. The City and its 
officers also alleged that plaintiff consented to the acts 
complained of and that the damage done was caused by 
an act of God, and by reason of the construction of a 
new channel resulting in draining off the water that 
had escaped from Spanish Fork River. (R. 41 to 44 and 
49 to 52, both inclusive). 
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendants over 
the objection of plaintiff, moved for leave to amend its 
pleading "to strike from the answer to the Amended 
Answer - it is paragraph - I don't know how they 
number it, but it says paragraph three on the third page. 
It starts there, "That at the time and times herein 
mentioned, the Spani~h Fork River after it went under 
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the bridge or the State Highway 91, and so forth. The 
evidence certainly shows otherwise." The defendants 
further asked leave to add to their pleading as an af-
firmative defense, to put in here the words "That at 
the time the elevation of the road to the Northeast of 
plaintiff's property was raised a great flood emergency 
existed resulting from the flood from Spanish Fork 
River, and in order to protect themselves from a common 
enemy, the City of Spanish Fork furnished trucks to 
Utah County in an effort to raise the elevation of the 
county road" and allege as a further affirmative matter 
that they did what they had a right to do and that they 
had a right to do so.;' (Tr. 202-203) The motions were 
granted. (Tr. 203-204) and later on January 26, 1956 
an amendment was filed. (R.140-141) 
A trial was had with a jury on the issues raised by 
the amended complaint with the amendment thereto and 
the answer of the defendant, Spanish Fork City and its 
officers. The Jury on November 19, 1955 found for the 
plaintiff and assessed her damage against Spanish 
Fork City in the sum of $2072.00 (R. 123). Thereafter the 
court set aside the verdict and granted judgment in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no 
cause of action. (R. 135-136) 
The plaintiff by this appeal seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the court below in vacating the verdict of 
the jury and granting defendant city judgment of no 
cause of action notwithstanding the verdict, and to have 
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5 
re-instated the verdict and the judgment pursuant there-
to. 
While there is some conflict in the evidence as to 
the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff on ac-
count of the forcing of the water complained of across 
plaintiff's land and some other minor matters, there 
is no substantial conflict in the evidence as to the f,acts 
which form the basis of plaintiff's complaint. 
These facts ,are established without any conflict in 
the evidence : 
During the winter of 1951 and 1952, there was more 
than the usual amount of snow fall on the water shed 
which drains into Spanish Fork River. In the late win-
ter of 1952 it became apparent that there was grave dan-
ger of high water as soon as there was warm weather. 
It was anticipated that there would be flood w·aters about 
six weeks before the high waters actually come down. 
(Tr. 121-122). On April 2, 1952, the following appears 
in the minutes of the meeting of the City Council on that 
day: 
"11:r. Parley Neeley, Ray Bradford, Wm. R. 
Jex, Orson Brown, Richard Taylor, S. A. Brad-
ford, Dean Ludlow, Andrew Nelson and Garland 
Swenson met with the council to discuss the flood 
problem of our community. Mr. Wm. R. Jex was 
spokesman and Parley Neeley explained very 
thoroughly the problem we are faced with by 
means of a map, picturing the river district. 
Mayor reports that county would help if property 
holders would sign a waiver so that they can go 
in and work on any and all property." 
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"Councilman Grotegut moved that the follow-
ing be selected as flood control committee: Mr. 
L. B. Snell, Councilman Beck representing City, 
Wm. R. Jex, Garland Swenson, Bishop Harold 
Swenson, Ray Bradford and Dean Ludlow. They 
are to go ahead and meet with county and work 
out plans to do what is necessary for the flood 
control agreeable to all property owners con-
cerned. They are to select their own chairman. 
Seconded by Councilman Isaac. Vote unanimous." 
( Trs. 92-93) 
On April 11, 1952, the following appears in the 
l\iinutes of the City Council of Spanish Fork City: 
"Councilman Anderson moved that we go 
along with County and State in $2000.00 each on 
dyke road and do all we can to cooperate with 
County and State in construction of road dyke 
and to authorize Mayor and Recorder to sign 
county agreement. Seconded by councilman Isaac. 
Vote Unanimous." (Tr. 93) 
An agreement was signed along in June and July 1952, 
see defendants' Exhibit 1. 
By an instrument dated ~\_pril 2, H)32, smne of the 
property owners along Spanish Fork RiYer signed what 
is designated as a Release. The original plaintiff in this 
action, Arthur T. l\JcJ~ell, \YH8 an1ong the signers. The 
instrument is 1narked Exhibit D. 39. Such instrument 
in part provides : 
"That we, propert~~ owners, along Spanish 
Fork River in Sections (nan1ing them) and also 
property owners ,along the canals and tributaries, 
of the Spanish Fork River in the above sections, 
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do hereby release the State of Utah, Utah County, 
the United States of America through the U.S. 
Engineers and the City of Spanish Fork from all 
liability for dmnages to any real or personal pro-
perty owned by the signers hereto in the ,above 
described sections along the Spanish Fork River, 
or along its canals and tributaries, by reason of 
work done or by or at the instance of any of the 
above described bodies politic, in dredging, clean-
ing, sand-bagging, doing revertment work and 
bank protection, removing debris, removing other 
obstructions, or doing any other work to alleviate 
flood conditions or present flooding from the 
Spanish Fork River or any of its canals or tribu-
taries or drainage system fed by the Spanish 
Fork River." 
In his deposition which was read to the jury (Tr. 
97-99) because Mr. A. T. :McKell was dead at the tirne 
of the trial, he testified concerning what was said when 
the so c.alled above Tnentioned Release was signed aR 
follows: 
That he did sign permission to take heavy equipment 
across his land to the river to clean out the river; that 
he was asked if he would sign this slip; that Mr. McKell 
said "Bishop, this is in case of wanting to get to the 
river with heavy equipment" (which was on the west 
of his land) ... "is just permission to cross your ground. 
"That he re.ad the agreement before he signed it (Deposi-
tion of A. T. McKell, pages 18 ,and 19) Mrs. McKell 
testified that she was present when the so-called re-
lease was signed by her husband and that at that time 
:J.fr. :McKell was told by Mr. Swenson, who brought the 
so-called release to the home of the plaintiff, that the 
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purpose of signing the instrument was to get consent to 
take heavy equipment over plaintiff's land that they 
were going to clean out the river. (Tr. 195) Mr. Swen-
son was questioned about the circumstances surrounding 
the signing of the so-called release, but his testimony 
does not shed much light on what was s.aid at the time 
Mr. M.:cKell signed the same. His testimony is not in 
conflict with that of the McKells. (Tr. 302-304) 
Spanish Fork River began flooding over the ad-
joining lands to the north and west of its channel in 
April 1952 and continued into the month of May 1952. 
It is so alleged in the Amended Complaint, (R. 22) and 
so admitted in defendants' Answer thereto. (R. 41) Th·~ 
evidence shows that the flood water that caused the 
damage complained of occurred during the latter part 
of April and the early part of !1:ay. (See testimony of 
Frances Lundell (Tr. 105): deposition of A. T. McKell, 
page 4 & 5; testimony of Arthur 11. l\fcKell, Tr. 188) 
At and before the time involved in this controversy 
there was a canal extending along the e.ast boundary of 
the :McKell property, along the east banks of which was 
a growth of willows a.nd briars. (Tr. 6-7 and also Trs. 
101). The slope of the land to the east of the plaintiff's 
property w.as towards the east and north. (Tr. 106 ~ Tr. 
79; Tr. 54 to 59) Spanish Fork City is and at all times 
complained of was the owner of a tract of land and 
improvements thereon to the south and just outside of 
the city which the city leased for $150.00 a year for a 
stock sale .and sheds (Tr. 289) Such property is about 
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2900 feet northwest of the McKell property (Tr. 61) anrl 
is about 15 feet 4 inches lower than the northeast cor-
ner of the plaintiff's property. (Tr. 58) 
There is a slight conflict in the evidence as to 
whether or not the plaintiff consented to the blasting 
of holes through the banks of the canal which marked 
the east boundary line of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff 
A. T. McKell said he did not so consent. (Deposition 
of Mr. McKell, page 38) Mr. Wm. Jex testified that 
Mr. :McKell asked him if something could not be done 
to contain the water in one channel. ( Tr. 255 to 256) 
Sometime after April 2, 1952 (Tr. 17) the exact date 
does not appear, some of the officers of Spanish Fork 
City, Utah County, and the State Road Commission 
entered into .an oral arrangement whereby the road ex-
tending east from the northeast corner of plaintiff's land 
should be raised and the expense therefor was to be 
paid in equal amounts by Utah County, Spanish Fork 
City and the State Road Commission, for the purpose 
of raising the road which extended to a hill about 1/3 
of .a mile east from the northeast corner of plaintiff's 
land. The estimated cost of this work was about 
$6000.00. Each of the parties were to furnish some equip-
ment. (Tr. 13 to 17). Pursuant to such agreement the 
road was raised about 2 feet on the east end thereof 
and about 4 feet on the west end. (Tr. 26) As a result 
of raising the road, the water w.as forced over plaintiff's 
property. The water which escaped from the Spanish 
Fork River had spread over a large area of land to the 
east of plaintiff's property before it reached the dyke 
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road, that is to say, the ro.ad was a little over 1/3 of 
a mile long. ( Tr. 191) There were 3 culverts under the 
road. They were 12 inch culverts, one of which was 
covered up. (Tr. 192) The water that escaped from 
Spanish Fork River had flowed some distance from the 
river before it reached the road which was raised. Mayor 
Nielson estimated the distance .at from 40 to 80 rods. 
(Tr. 282) 
Soon after the road was raised it became apparent 
that great damage was being done to the plaintiff's 
property by the large quantity of water that w.as being 
forced over the same. 
W m. R. J ex who had been active in a plan where-
by his property would be saved from flooding secured 
some powder to enable Frances Lundell to do some blast-
ing on plaintiff's property. (Tr. 101) :.Jir. Lundell put 
in a number of blasts whereby a channel was cut through 
the banks of the canal which fonned the east boundary 
of plaintiff's land and also through plaintiff's land to 
the river. (Tr. 103) By that means a channel was cut 
through plaintiff's land in which the 1vater was con-
centrated (Tr. 104) That blasting \Yas done about May 
5th or 6th. (Tr. 105). Arthur :.Jirl~ell expressed it as 
his opinion that if it had not been for the dyking of t~e 
road his property would not have been damaged and 
that he could have saved the washing away of the land 
next to the river if it had not been because the large 
amount of water that was accu1nulated next to the dyked 
road .and forced over his land prevented him from getting 
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onto his land with equipment and cutting down trees 
that were growing along the banks of the river. We quote 
a portion of his testimony touching that matter: 
"If I could have gotten across (the water 
flowing over the northern part of plaintiff's land) 
why I think there is some land on the west, the 
northwest corner, I could have saved, by drop-
ping those trees .along the bank, there were trees 
available for that purpose." 
That he had lived on a ranch where he had a lot of flood 
w.ater to contend with. That he had a fraction over 25 
acres of land in the premises involved in this action. De-
position of Arthur T. :McKell, Trs. 8-9. He thus described 
the damage done to his land : 
The land was worth $600.00 per acre, some land just 
north of his land sold for that amount per acre. (Dep. 
9-10) That the following improvements and personal 
property was washed .away. A manure spreader of the 
value of $60.00, a hay rake of the value of $50.00, a 
spring tooth of the value of $25.00, a harrow of the value 
of $25.00. The corral and yard of the value of $1,412.26. 
That he had been engaged in the lumber business for 
36 ye.ars and knew the value of lumber; that the material 
in the feed manger had a value of $408.75 (Tr. 11) That 
the fence which was washed away had a value of $240.00 
of which he should get 80% from the government (Tr. 
12) That he had not received anything from the govern-
ment; that the government charged $1300.00 for level-
ing the land for which he was to p.ay $330.00. (Tr. 13) 
That in addition to the $240.00 for fences, there was 
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$560.15, making a total of $800.15, (Tr. 14) That the 
flowing well was broken off by the flood and to drill a 
new well would cost about $500.00. (at the time of the 
trial the well had been repaired at a cost of $125.00 (Tr. 
197) ). The witness was not certain as to the number of 
acres of land that was washed away. He gave it as his 
opinion that about one-half of his land was washed away 
and that not washed away was depreciated in value 25%. 
(Tr. 16) That the value of the land, the top of which 
was washed away was of little value, probably not over 
$100.00 (Depos. 17) 
Other evidence offered by plaintiff at the trial came 
from Lawrence M. Atwood, a real estate broker, who 
was sent over by Utah County to appraise the damage 
done to the l\fcKell property. He placed the value of 
the land at $600.00 per acre. (Tr. 37). He further test-
ified that between 3 and 4 acres of land were washed 
away by reason of the water being forced over plain-
tiff's land. (Tr. 37). Other testimony touching the dam-
age done to the plaintiff's property was given by Mark 
I\1:cKell who testified ihat no crops could be grown on 
the property here involved in either 1952 or 1953 except 
about 3 acres. (Tr. 1±4) That only about 15 acres of 
land was saved from the 25 ac.res. ( Tr. 145) Evidence 
was also offered .and received as to the productivity of 
the land before it was damaged by having the top soil 
removed. See testimony of Arthur T. McKell (Tr. 185-
186 and testimony of S. R. Boswell (Tr. 124-129.) 
Numerous photographs of the I\ld~elly property were 
received in evidence from which the damage done can 
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be seen. There is other evidence touching the amount of 
damage sustained by reason of the water having been 
forced over plaintiff's land, but at this time we refrain 
from discussing the same in greater detail because we 
do not know the basis for the court granting defendant 
city a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Suffice it 
to say that the evidence shows that plaintiff was dam-
aged in the following amounts: About $2000.00 for the 
machinery and improve1nents w.ashed away, in excess 
of $2000.00 for the land washed away, about $3000.00 in 
damage to the land not washed away, and another 
$2000.00 or more due to the fact that the land not washed 
away did not produce any crops because of its being 
leveled. 
As we understood the situation at the time the mat-
ter was argued in the lower court, the judgment rendered 
by the court was not because the evidence did not estab-
lish the amount of damage found by the jury. That 
being so, probably no useful purpose will be served at 
this time, by a further discussion of that phase of the 
case. Should defendant city make the claim that the 
evidence as to the matter of damages is not sufficient 
to support the verdict of the jury, we can probably meet 
such contention in a reply brief. 
ARGUMENT 
An examination of the various pleadings and mo-
tions filed in this case will reveal that the defendant city 
has advanced a number of theories upon which it has 
based its defense to the action brought against it and 
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then has apparently abandoned such defense and shifted 
to other and at time inconsistent defenses. Thus under 
date of March 23, 1953 the defendant city moved to dis-
miss the action because the acts complained of were 
committed beyond the city and therefore ultra vires. 
(R. 59). 
The next 1notion filed by defendant city was to 
dismiss the action set out in the amended complaint be-
cause the facts therein alleged were ultra vires and 
were done as a governmental function. (R. 60) By its 
next motion, the defendant city sought summary judg-
ment. (Tr. 68) In its original ans\Yer to plaintiff's 
amended complaint, the defendant city sets up as an 
affirmative defense that it did not participate in the 
performance of the acts complained of except that some 
of the trucks belonging to Spanish Fork City were used 
by Utah County to haul the gravel to raise the ro.ad 
extending easterly from plaintiff's land; that the plain-
tiff consented to the doing of that which was done by 
the defendants who were released fron1 any damage 
that may have been done by the .acts complained of; 
that the damage done to plaintiff's land was an Act of 
God; that the dan1age con1plained of was caused by the 
straightening of the river channel below the McKell 
property; that the officers were too busy trying to save 
its spring water to devote any time with respect to the 
handling of the water that flowed across plaintiff's land; 
that the water which was forced over the plaintiff's 
land was brought about by a wire fence along the south 
side of the road which was raised against which fence 
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weeds, paper and debris lodged causing the water to be 
diverted across plaintiff's land. (R. 41-44) After the 
plaintiff had offered its evidence and rested, the de-
fendant city asked and was granted leave to strike its 
allegation to the effeet that plaintiff's damage was 
caused by the straightening of the river below the Mc-
Kell land, and to amend the pleading by alleging that "at 
the time the elevation of the county road was raised, a 
great flood emergency existed resulting from the threat-
ened flood of the Spanish Fork River and in order to 
protect itself and others from a common enemy and dis-
aster, the city of Spanish Fork participated with Utah 
County in raising the elevation of the county road and 
further allege that it had a right under the law so to do in 
order to save itself from a common enemy." (R. 140) It 
will be noted that the amendment was made long after the 
action was concluded. We, of course, are mindful that 
a defendant may assert and rely upon as many defenses 
as he or it may desire, but we do contend that the court 
abused its discretion }n permitting the .amendment that 
was allowed after the plaintiff had concluded its evidence 
and rested. 
We are at a loss to know the exact basis of the 
judgment appealed from. That is the judgment award-
ing the defendant city a judgment of no cause of action 
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. However, we 
shall discuss those matters which apparently the court 
below had in mind in rendering the judgment appealed 
from under the following points. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADING BY STRIK-
ING FROM THE COMPLAINT THE ALLEGATIONS TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS CAUSED BY A CHANGE IN THE 
COURSE OF THE RIVER AND SUBSTITUTING THEREFOR 
THE ALLEGATION THAT THE DEFENDANT CITY HAD 
A RIGHT TO DO WHAT WAS DONE BECAUSE OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY TO PROTECT ITS PROP-
ERTY FROM A COMMON ENEMY (Tr. 140). 
POINT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF RELEASED THE DEFENDANT CITY FROM LIA-
BILITY ON ACCOUNT OF THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF. 
POINT THREE 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, THE DOC-
TRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS IS NOT IN-
VOLVED. 
POINT FOrR 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING 
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF 
A JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT CITY NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT BY REASON OF AN 
EMERGENCY. 
POINT Fil'"E 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING 
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING 
OF A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
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UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT FLOOD WATER IS A COM-
MON ENEMY AGAINST WHICH A LAND OWNER MAY DO 
WHAT WAS HERE DONE TO PROTE,CT ITS PROPERTY. 
POINT SIX 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE AMOUNT 
AWARDED TO HER BY THE JURY BY REASON OF 
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT "PRIVATE 
PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN OR DAMAGED FOB. 
PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION." 
In light of the amendment to the answer of the 
defendant city to the effect that it assisted in raising 
the road in question to protect itself and others ( R. 140), 
we assume that no reliance is had on the allegation of 
its answer before the amendment was allowed and made, 
that in the original allegation to the effect that the city 
did not participate in the raising of the road (R. 41-44). 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
DEFENDANTS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADING BY STRIK-
ING FROM THE COMPLAINT THE ALLEGATIONS TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS ,CAUSED BY A CHANGE IN THE 
COURSE OF THE RIVER AND SUBSTITUTING THEREFOR 
THE ALLEGATION THAT THE DEFENDANT CITY HAD 
A RIGHT TO DO WHAT WAS DONE BECAUSE OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY TO PROTECT ITS PROP-
ERTY FROM A COMMON ENEMY (Tr. 140). 
We are mindful that a trial court has a discretion 
to allow amendment of pleadings, and that under Rule 
15b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure an amend-
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ment may be made at any time, even after judg1nent, 
to c:ause the pleadings to conform to the evidence. How-
ever, in this case the defendant city in its answer (R. 43) 
alleged that by reason of changing the course of the 
river and lowering the same "10 or 12 feet this made 
a heavy draw and washed out the plaintiff's land 
and other lands above the highway 91; had this not 
been lowered, the plaintiff would not have suffered 
very much damage and said river would have drained 
off slowly and the cutting of the banks and the land 
would not have occurred." 
Even in those states such as California where the 
doctrine of the right of a property owner to take meas-
ures to protect his property against flood waters, such 
right must be exercised reasonably and without negli-
gence. House vs. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dis-
trict, 153 Pac. (2d) 950. In this case, the sudden lower-
ing of the channel of the river some ten or hvelye feet 
below plaintiff's land resulting in the dmnage, com-
plained of, might well have constituted negligence. 
While the evidence does not show just what part, if .any. 
the officers or employees of the City took in the work 
of lowering the channel of the river, the eYidence does 
show that the City entered into an arrange1nent with 
Utah County and the State Road Con1mission to take 
over the control of the flood water. See testilnony of 
Mr. Ehner, Tr. 9. By granting the nwtion of defendant 
City to strike snell allegations, especian~~ after plaintiff 
rested, deprived her of a right to rely upon such allega-
tions as an ad1nission of the defendant City that 1night 
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well have constituted negligence. The mere fact that 
the City may not have directly participated in the sud-
den lowering of the channel of the river, to plaintiff's 
damage, does not relieve it from liability. 52 Am. Jur. 
-15-1 and 455, Sections 114, 115 and 116, and cases cited 
in footnotes. 
POINT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF RELEASED THE DEFENDANT CITY FROM LIA-
BILITY ON ACCOUNT OF THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF. 
Defendant City claims that it was released fron1 
the damages complained of by reason of the language 
contained in Exhibit D. 40 which reads thus: "That 
we ... hereby release ... the City of Spanish Fork 
from all liability for damage to any real or personal 
property owned by the signers hereto in the .above de-
scribed sections along Spanish Fork River or along its 
canals and tributaries, by reason of work done by or 
at the instance of the above described bodies politic in 
dredging, cleaning, sandbagging, doing revertment work 
and bank protection, removing debris, removing other 
obstructions, or in doing any other work to .alleviate 
flood conditions or prevent flooding from Spanish Fork 
River, or any of its canals or tributaries, or drainage 
system fed by the Spanish Fork River." 
The plaintiff is not here complaining because of the 
doing of any of the acts specified in the above mentioned 
document. The only language that even remotely may 
be said to release the City from the acts complained of 
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are the general provisions contained in the latter portion 
of the language above quoted. The well recognized rule 
of "ejusden generis" prevents the defendants from 
making any such a claim. W. S. Hatch Co. vs. Public 
Service Commission, :3 Utah (2d) 7; 277 2nd Pac. 809. 
That rule is especially applicable here. It is obvious that 
Mr. McKell signed the instrument so that his property 
might be protected from the high waters of the river and 
was never intended as a permission to destroy his farm, 
the improvements thereon and farming equipment. The 
language used is clear as to the purpose sought by the 
permission granted. Moreover, if it should be claimed 
that the language is uncertain, the testimony heretofor~ 
referred to of ~l r. McKell at the time he signed the 
instrument shows what was intended. 
POINT THREE 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, THE DOC-
TRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS IS NOT IN-
VOLVED. 
During the early stages of this .action the defendant 
Cit~T seemed to rely upon two propositions, namely, that 
even if the officers of the City were liable, the City could 
not be held to respond in dmnages because under the 
facts alleged, the acts complained of were done in the 
performance of a governmental function and in any event 
the acts were done outside of the corporate lilnits of 
the city. 
There are two reasons why the acts co1nplained of 
do not come within the doctrine which precludes a re-
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covery from a City for acts performed in furtherance 
of a governmental function. They are: When a City 
takes or damages property for a public purpose, it is 
no defense to s.ay that the same was done in furtherance 
of a governmental function. The provisions of Section 
:22 of Article one of the State Constitution makes no such 
distinction. The maintenance and protection of property 
which is leased for a stock sale is not the performance 
of a governmental function. McQuillin on ~f unicipal 
Corporations, 2nd Ed. Vol. 6, Sec. 2793, where it is said 
that: ''A distinction must be dr.awn, however, between 
injuries to property rights and other injuries, since if 
the officers of a municipality in the discharge of its 
governmental functions and police power invade prop-
erty rights, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies 
and the corporation is liable for their acts." Numerous 
cases are cited in a footnote to the text .above quoted 
which support the doctrine therein announced. vV e have 
found no case holding that if property is taken or 
damaged for a public purpose, no recovery Inay be had 
if such taking or damaging is for a governmental pur-
pose. We doubt that any such case can be found where 
there is a constitutional provision such as Article One, 
Section 22 of our State Constitution. The fact that the 
acts complained of were performed outside of the City 
would seem to be immaterial. The City may take such 
measures as are necessary to protect its property out-
side of the City as well as that which is within the City. 
It is so provided in U.C.A. 1953-10-8-2. 
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POINT FOUR 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING 
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF 
A JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT CITY NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT BY REASON OF AN 
EMERGENCY. 
An emergency as that word is generally understood 
and as defined by the adjudicated cases is a sudden un-
expected occurrence which calls for immediate action 
to avoid an innninent peril. 29 C.J.S. 760-762 and cases 
there cited. The evidence in this case falls far short of 
measuring up to the elements necessary to constitute an 
emergency. It was generally known in 1farch, 1952 at 
least six weeks before the high water came down Spanish 
Fork River that high water would occur. See testin1ony 
of Francis Lundell (Tr. 121-122). The testimony of 
Mayor Nielson is to the san1e effect ( Tr. 29-!). ~Ioreover 
on April 2, 1952, "\Villimn R. J ex and Parley X eeley very 
thoroughly explained the flood problem (Tr. 92). Xoth-
ing was done, hm,·e-..:er, towards protecting the :\ld(ell 
property, but on the contrar:· when action was taken, it 
was calculated to and did cause ,·ery substantial dmnage 
to plaintiff's property. ~Ioreover. if the testi1non~r given 
h~r Mayor Nielson is to be believed, no substantial dmnage 
would have been done if the water had been pern1itted to 
take its natural course. ~Iayor Nielson testified: 
"If there hadn't been any work done on the 
road at all, it would have changed the flood situa-
tion by very little. Some water, maybe, would 
have gone over the road, but not enough to have 
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hurt anybody else. There was a woven wire fence 
on the south side of the road that the county 
raised and debris of all sorts piled up against that 
and, of course, coursed the water back towards 
the river" ( Tr. 299). 
The evidence shows that Mr. Wm. R. Jex was the 
principal person who was concerned .about raising thA 
road because he was afraid of some construction work 
he was doing would be flooded. He was fearful that his 
property might be flooded as early as March 1, 1952. 
:Mr. Neeley was also apparently interested bec.ause h8 
owned property near that of Mr. J ex which was in the 
southwest corner of Spanish Fork City (Tr. 258-259). 
We do not contend that some water would not have found 
its way into portions of Spanish Fork City and across 
the land owned by Spanish Fork City which it leases for 
the purpose of conducting stock sales thereon, but we 
do contend th.at the plaintiff may not be required to bear 
the whole burden, without being compensated therefor, 
of the damage done to her property in order to save 
from damage the property of others that might have 
bee:g damaged if the water had been allowed to take its 
natural course. 
POINT FIVE 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR AT ALL, JUSTIFY THE VACATING 
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING 
OF A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT FLOOD WATER IS A COM-
MON ENEMY AGAINST WHICH A LAND OWNER MAY DO 
WHAT WAS HERE DONE TO PROTECT ITS PROPERTY. 
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There is well established conflict in the adjudicated 
cases dealing with what may and what may not be done 
by a land owner to protect his property from flood 
waters. Indeed the authorities are not in accord as to 
when waters escaping from a natural channel cease to 
be regarded .as flood waters. The question as to what may 
and what may not be done to control waters escaping 
from a natural channel has been before the courts on 
numerous occasions, both in the United States and in 
England. California seems to have more than its share 
of such cases. It is apparently the well settled law in 
the State of California that the flow of surface water 
may not be interferred with. That is to say, the owner 
of the higher lands has an easement over the lower land 
to have the water from the upper land flow over the 
lower lands without interference that will injure the 
upper lands, and so also, the upper land owner may not 
change the manner in which the water is wont to flow 
off his land to the injury of the lower land owner. It 
also seems to be the settled law in California that one 
whose lands abut a river may protect himself against 
flood waters notwithstanding barriers erected 1nay cause 
flood waters to rise higher or flow with greater force 
on a neighbor's land. Among the cases fron1 California 
so holding are LeBrun vs. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 
Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R. 336; Archer vs. City of Los Angeles, 
119 Pac. ( 2d) 1, in which numerous California cases are 
reviewed and in which there is a long dissenting opinion 
of two of the justices of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. The case of O'Hara vs. Los Angeles County Flood 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
Control District is to the same effect. 119 Pac. (2d) 23, in 
which the justices divide as they did in the Archer 
case. 
It will be seen from those cases and other cases cited 
therein that surface waters are those resulting frorn 
r.ain and snow falling upon the land, while flood waters 
are those which overflow the banks of a river or lake. 
It will also be noted that in California one Inay not 
lawfully impead the flow of a natural stream if to do 
so results in an injury to other land owners. 
The law as .announced by the California courts and 
some others is in direct conflict with the law in other 
jurisdictions. Thus, while in California, one may not 
interfer with the natural flow of surface water, in \Vash-
ington surface waters are held to be a common enemy 
from which a land owner may do what is reasonably 
necessary to protect his property against the same. 
It is also held in some jurisdiction that waters which 
escape from a river at time of a flood are surface 
waters and not waters of a stream, and a property owner 
may defend himself against the same, although to do 
so may cause injury to others who have done nothing 
to protect themselves. Harvey vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 
116 Pac. 464. In the case of K eck et al v. Venghause, et al, 
127 Iowa 529; 103 N.W. 773, it is held that a riparian 
owner may not embank against the natural overflow 
from an inland stream where the effect is to cause an 
increased volume of water on the lands of another. To 
the s.ame effect are M ouvaisterre Drainage and Levee 
Dist. vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 299 Ill. 298, 132 N.E. 559; 
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O'Connell 'VS. East Tennessee G. R. Co., 87 Ga. 246; 
13 N.E. 489. In the case of Sullivan vs. DooZy, 31 Tex. 
Civ. App. 589; 73 S.W. 82, it is held that no distinction 
may be made between surface and flood waters and that 
the rights of the parties is to be determined by the con-
tour of the territory, and that no change may be made 
to the damage of another. That under the common law 
one must so used his own property as not to damage the 
property of another. 
In the case of Fordhmn vs. Northern P. R. Co., 50 
Mont. 729; 76 Pac. 1040, it is held that water which over-
flows the banks of a river is still .a part of the stream and 
may not be interfered with. Cases dealing with the ques-
tion here presented will be found collected in 16 A.L.R. 
629; 22 A.L.R. 944 and 81 A.L.R. 262. See also 40 A.L.R. 
848. 
vV e have not attempted to review the numerous eases 
dealing with the questions here presented. To do that 
would extend this brief far beyond the length that this 
court has indicated should be the limit of a brief. So 
also the court will doubtless discover from a re.ading 
of the cases cited that the smne are in hopeless conflict 
as between different jurisdictions and at times in the 
same jurisdietion. Moreover, the facts in this case arc 
sueh that it becomes unnecessary to follow any of the 
various eonflieting doctrines announced by the adjudi-
c.ated cases. Thus, it is the established law in states 
which adhere to the doctrine that flood waters are a 
eommon enem)~ and as sueh a property owner 1nay take 
such reaf\onahle measures as are necessary to protect 
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his property against such waters that he becomes liable 
if he is negligent in performing such work. House vs. 
Los Angeles Cmtnty Flood Control District, 153 Pac. 
(2d) 950. 
While in this case there may well be an absence of 
negligence in the manner in which the road running e.ast 
from the northeast corner of plaintiff's land was raised, 
there could not well be any question about the defendants 
being negligent in failing, for a period of six weeks after 
they knew the danger of flood waters, to do anything 
to prevent darnage from the flood. The defendants 
sought .and was granted a license to go upon the river 
and do the necessary work to prevent damage to itself 
and the owners of the land abuting on the river about 
three weeks before the situation became serious. Aside 
from that the defendants wilfully raised the road to 
intercept the water escaping from the river and cast 
it onto the ).[eKell property .at the northeast corner 
thereof. 
Some of the witnesses, particularly Mayor Nielson of 
defendant city who testified that he knew that the road 
was being raised to divert the water across :\JcKell's 
land back into the river. I don't think it was to divert it 
across ~lcKell's land (Tr. 282). To the same effect is the 
testimony of Mr. Lewis (Tr. 314), of Ed M. Beck (Tr. 
317) Bert D. Is.aac (Tr. 320). He stated that at the 
council meeting it was discussed that they should be care-
ful not to trespass on private property ( Tr. 320) and 
of ~rr. Anderson (Tr. 316). The minutes of the city 
council of the defendant city show that the city undertook 
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to aid in raising the road (Tr. 92-93), and finally after 
plaintiff's evidence was all in, the defendants asked for 
and were granted leave to amend their pleadings and 
allege that the city did aid in doing the work of raising 
the road (Tr. 202-204). It is thus apparent that the 
defendant city was a party to the infliction of the damage 
complained of. There was some controversy as to 
whether or not the plaintiff authorized the dynamiting 
on plaintiff's land. In light of the fact that it is made 
to appear that the dynamiting was made necessary to 
minimize the dmnage to the ~1:cKell property, it would 
seem that it is not material as to whether :McKell did 
or did not authorize something to be done to reduce the 
amount of damage. 
Returning to the law applicable to a state of facts 
such as are here presented, we direct the attention of the 
court to the case of Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v. Beardsley Land 
and Investment Co., et al., 282 Pac. 937, 36 Ariz. 65, and 
cases there cited. In that case an irrigation canal had been 
constructed .and in order to protect the same against 
water that can1e from the higher ground adjacent 
thereto, an embankment \vas constructed parallel to the 
canal to intercept water that n1ight flow against and 
destroy the c.anal. The water so intercepted was carried 
some distance by the embankn1ent and cast upon the 
lands at or near the end of the embanklnent. \Yhile 
Arizona adheres to the smue doctrine as California as 
to flood waters, the Supreme Court of Arizona in dis-
posing of the c.ase said that there is a manifest distinc-
tion between c.asting waters upon anothers land and pre-
venting the flow of water upon your own land. The 
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evidence in this case conclusively shows that the raising 
of the road was intended to and of necessity did cast the 
water onto the McKell land. There was no where else 
that it could go. The defendant city may not be heard to 
say that it did not intend the results that were brought 
about by the raising of the road. 
The defendants seem to place some importance as 
to the matter of whether or not they actually entered 
upon plaintiff's premises. If an actual entry had been 
made on the McKell premises and a canal excavated tn 
the river, doubtless less damage would have been done 
than was done by turning the large quantjty of water 
thereon and then let the water cut its way to the river 
and wash away much more land that it would have 
done if a channel had been excavated. Needless to say 
to thus turn water onto the land of another constitutes 
a trespass. 87 C .• J.S. 966 and cases there cited. 
Before leaving this phase of the case, we again 
direct the attention of the court to the evidence which 
shows that the land was higher along the east boundary 
of plaintiff's land than was the land farther east. That 
there was a canal extending along the east boundary of 
plaintiff's land so that the road had to be raised about 
four feet to force the water across plaintiff's land. If 
the doctrine of the right to ward off flood waters is 
applicable to the facts in this case, it follows that Mci\:ell 
had such right, as well as the city. We wonder what 
would have happened if McKell had not been confined to 
his home because ill and had gone out with trucks to 
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compete with the city to see which could build the high-
er embankment. 
POINT SIX 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE AMOUNT 
AWARDED TO HER BY THE JURY BY REASON OF 
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT "PRIVATE 
PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN OR DAMAGED FOR 
PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION." 
Since the amendment of the City; pleading was 
made to the effect that the road was raised to protect 
the property of the defendant from the flood watert' of 
Spanish Fork River and the evidence shows such to be 
the fact, it would seem that this case resolves itself into 
two issues, namely the question of law: Do the facts bring 
this case within the protection of Article One, Section 
22 of the Utah Constitution, or does it as a matter of 
law fall within the Police Power of the defendants, and 
the question of fact as to the dmnage sustained by the 
plaintiff~ 
We have heretofore in this brief directed the atten-
tion of the Court to the evidence of the dmnage sustained 
by the plaintiff. The amount of dmnages awarded to 
the plaintiff is much less than the evidence would sustain, 
but the plaintiff does not raise any question of its being 
inadequate. It is plaintiff's position that the facts 
in this case falls far short of bringing it within the doc-
trine of the police power. 
If we accept the testilnony of :Mayor Nielson Yiewec1 
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in the light of what would have happened if the road 
had not been r,aised, it would lead one to the conclusion 
that the raising of the road was not even necessary (Tr. 
299). To the same effect is the testimony of the members 
of the City Council (Tr. 314, 316, 317 and 320). It would 
be stretching the police power far beyond the breaking 
point to say because some water would flood over part 
of Spanish Fork City, that a c,alamity or catastrophe 
would flow therefrom. Had it not been that the water 
which was forced over the McKell property was concen-
trated in a large stream with a preciptable slope toward 
the river, it is doubtful if any substantial damage would 
have been done to the McKell property. Nor does the 
evidence support the claim that there was an emergency 
when viewed in the light of the fact that it was known 
for at least six weeks before high water came that it 
would come. If an emergency existed at the time the 
flood c,ame, it was in part at least the product of the 
defendant City in that it failed to take steps to prepare 
for the flood until long after the same became apparent, 
and even then without any reason being rnade apparent, 
they devoted their time and energy in building up the 
ro,ad instead of doing what was necessary and what they 
were authorized to do by making the channel of the river 
able to carry the additional water. 
It is of course the law that the primary function of 
the exercise of the police power is to regulate the use of 
property not to damage or confiscate the same except in 
case of dire necessity. Lewis, on Eminent Dom,ain, 3 Ed., 
Y ol. 1, Sec. 6, pages 13. See also discussion in the case 
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of Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 119 Pac. (2d) 20 and 
the case of O'Hara v. Los Angeles County, 119 Pac. (2d), 
23. 
In this case it would appear that the duly constituted 
County Commissioners of Utah County and the State 
Legislature of Utah thought that this was a case where 
the McKells were entitled to be paid for the damage sus-
tained. Otherwise they would not have paid them what 
they thought was their just proportion of such damages. 
It was Spanish Fork City, through its officers, that 
originally urged that action be taken which resulted in 
the damages to plaintiff's property. There is every 
reason why the defendant City should not be permitted 
to escape paying its just share of the dan1ages. That 
the defendant City may be required to respond in dam-
ages by .an action against it under the Doctrine of Emi-
nent Domain, even if it does not forn1ally bring an action 
in condemnation, seems to be well and universally settled. 
O'Hara vs. Los Angeles City, supra. 
It is submitted that the judgment vacating the ver-
dict of the jury and rendering judgment in f.avor of the 
defendant City should be reversed and the Court then 
should be directed to reinstate the verdict of the jury 
and to render judgment in confonnity therewith and 
that appellant should be awarded her costs herein ex-
pended. Appellant prays that this court so direct. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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